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Abstract
We analyze a conservative market model for the competition among economic agents
in a close society. A minimum dynamics ensures that the poorest agent has a chance
to improve its economic welfare. After a transient, the system self-organizes into a
critical state where the wealth distribution have a minimum threshold, with almost
no agent below this poverty line, also, very few extremely rich agents are stable in
time. Above the poverty line the distribution follows an exponential behavior. The
local solution exhibits a low Gini index, while the mean field solution of the model
generates a wealth distribution similar to welfare states like Sweden.
Key words: econophysics, inequalities, wealth distribution, minimum dynamics,
PACS: 89.65.Gh, 89.75.Fb, 05.65.+b, 87.23.Ge
1 Introduction
The study of the distribution of the income of workers, companies and coun-
tries started a little more than a century ago when Italian economist Vilfredo
Pareto investigated data of personal income for different European countries
and found a power law distribution that seems not to depend on different
economic conditions of the countries. In 1887, in his book Cours d’Economie
Politique (1) he asserted that in all countries and times the distribution of
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income and wealth follows a power law behavior where the cumulative prob-
ability P (w) of people whose income is at least w is given by P (w) ∝ w−α,
where the exponent α is named Pareto index. This universal power law is now
called Pareto law and he found himself that the index assumes values typically
close to 1.5 for several countries. The reduction of the slope α denotes a higher
inequality of the income distribution.
However, recent data suggest that Pareto’s distribution does not agree with
observed data over the middle range of income, but it is generally accepted that
it provides a good fit to the distribution of high range of income. Many other
distributions of income were proposed, supported by international empirical
data, and the distribution behaves in a log-normal, exponential or Levy way
(2) in the middle income range. For instance, there are data from Japan and
USA that are fitted by a log-normal distribution in middle range plus a power
law for high income one (3), data from United Kingdom income and wealth
fitted by an exponential law (middle range) and a power law (high range) (4)
and data from Brazil (5) worker’s income and enterprise capital that are fitted
by a log-normal plus a power law for high range of income (6).
One of the goals of the study of wealth distribution is to determine the social
inequalities implied in a given model of economic exchanges. Many ways to
quantitatively measure the fairness of a given income distribution have been
proposed in the economic science. Among them, the Gini index is well known
and frequently used. In brief, for any given wealth density function p(x), with
mean ρ and a given number ν ∈ [0, 1], P (≤ ν) =
∫ ν
0
p(x)dx represents the cu-
mulative fraction of population with wealth bellow ν and Lorenz function L(ν)
is defined as the fraction of the total wealth which is attributed to the poorest
100ν percentage of the society. It easy to show that L(ν) = 1
ρ
∫ ν
0
xp(x)dx. Gini
index can be then defined as G = 2
∫
1
0
(ν − L(ν))dν (7). It assumes values
between 0 percent (perfect equality) and 100 percent (perfect inequality).
Recently we developed a simple parameter free model for the competition
among different economic agents within a conservative model. Results for the
wealth distribution has been published (8) and also considering the effect of a
small world network (9). Within this model we obtained an exponential Gibbs-
style distribution for the wealth, with a finite lower threshold or poverty line,
that is characteristic of models with extremal dynamics. In spite of the fact
that this kind of distribution seems to be at stake when compared with Pareto
law, the idea of a society that take measures in order to improve the situation
of the most impoverished is compatible with the propositions of John Rawls,
in his book “A Theory of Justice” (10), directed towards an inventive way
of securing equality of opportunity as one of the basic principles of justice.
He asserts that no redistribution of resources within...a state can occur unless
it benefits the least well-off and this should be the only way to prevent the
stronger (or richer) from overpowering the weaker (or poorer). It seems that a
2
minimum dynamics, as that proposed in the Bak-Sneppen model (11), when
applied to economics, is a way to ensure to the poorest agent a chance to
improve its situation.
In the next section we resume the principal assumptions of the model and
the principal results of the numerical simulations. The calculation of the Gini
index and the comparison with wealth distribution of several countries will be
presented in section 3 along with the conclusions
2 The Conservative Exchange Market Model
The Conservative Exchange Market Model (CEMM) (8) is a simple macroe-
conomic model that consists of an one-dimensional lattice with N sites and
periodic boundary conditions, where every site represents an economic agent
(individuals, industries or countries). To each agent it is assigned some wealth-
parameter that represents its welfare, like the GNI for countries or salary for
individuals. We choose an initial configuration where the wealth is a number
between 0 and 1 distributed randomly among agents. The dynamics of the
system is supported on the idea that some measure should be taken to mod-
ify the situation of the poorest agent. In this context, we model this process
by a minimum dynamics (11): at each time step, the poorest agent, i.e., the
one with the minimum wealth, will take some action, trying to improve its
economic state. Since the outcome of any such measure is uncertain, the min-
imum suffers a random change in its wealth (8). We assume that whatever
wealth is gained (or lost) by the poorest agent it will be at the expense of its
neighbors and we assume that it is equally debited (or credited) between its
two nearest neighbors on the lattice, making the total wealth constant. So,
the CEMM dynamic can be reduced as follows:
• Find out the site with minimum wealth xmin;
• Substitute w(xmin) to wnew, a new random number between 0 and 1 ex-
tracted from an uniform distribution;
• Make the difference, ∆ = wnew(xmin)− w(xmin)
• Updating the neighbors:
w(xmin − 1) = w(xmin − 1)−∆/2
w(xmin + 1) = w(xmin + 1)−∆/2
Note that if ∆ is positive (negative) the wealth of the neighbors will be
reduced (increased) by ∆/2.
Numerical simulations on this model showed that, after a relatively long tran-
sient, the system arrives at a self organized critical (SOC) state with a station-
ary wealth distribution (figure 1(8)) in which almost all agents are beyond a
certain threshold. On Fig1 we represent both the cases of local exchanges and
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Fig. 1. Distribution wealth P (w) for the model with interactions to nearest neighbors
(upper curves) and with global interactions (lower curves). In both cases we have
superposed scaled data corresponding to N = 200, 400, 1000. The histograms were
built using 105 consecutive states, after a transient of 106 steps has elapsed.
Fig. 2. Snapshot of avalanche propagation for the local case. The sites with maxi-
mum wealth are very stable in time.
of global exchanges (mean field solution); in the former case the poverty line is
ηT ≈ 0.4 and above this threshold the distribution of agents is an exponential
P (w) ≈ exp(−w2/2σ2), with σ = 0.228 (9), i.e., there are exponentially few
rich agents while the mass of them remains in what we call a middle class. In
the second case the figure show the globally coupled (mean field) exchanges
(lower curves). This corresponds to a situation in which the agents with which
the exchange takes place are chosen at random and not based on geographical
proximity. This mean field solution exhibits a lower threshold, ηT ≈ 0.2, and
beyond it also an exponential distribution, P (w) ≈ exp(−w2/2σ2), but with
a higher value of σ = 0.567 (9).
The temporal evolution, in the SOC state, of the position of the system’s
minimum and maximum wealth is quite different. While the site of mini-
mum wealth is changing continuously, generating avalanches of all sizes among
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Fig. 3. Probability of an agent become wealthier in a time step for a market with
N = 1000 agents.
neighbors, the wealthiest site is stable over relatively long periods of time (8)
as it is represented by the lines in the figure 2. Indeed, even when affected by
an avalanche the maximum can frequently recover its status after a short time.
Not only the absolute maximum is stable, but also a privileged group, whose
wealth is around the same value of the maximum, remains in its prosperous
position for quite a while. This group is also privileged by having high wealth
values, well above the market average. In the mean-field case the rich sites are
also stable, but over shorter periods of time.
We also observed that the probability that the minimum asset agent improve
its situation in a time step is relatively high. It is very high at the beginning of
the simulation, then it decreases during the transient to finally converge to a
finite value, p ≈ 0.77 as it is shown on figure 3. We remark that the probability
is well above 0.5, so this minimum dynamic has the effect of improve, in the
average, the situation of the poorer agents.
3 Income inequality
Inequalities are related to social and economic phenomena and is a subject of
much debate. The fraction of rich and poor people in a country depends on
the inequalities of the income distribution. The standard way to determine the
inequality of a wealth distribution is with the help of quintile tables that show
the percentage of national income received by equal percentiles of individuals
or households ranked by their per capita income levels. For example in a
welfare state as Sweden the richest 20 percent of the population receives about
4 times more than the poorest quintile, while in a ruthless capitalistic country
like Brazil the richest quintile receives more than 25 times more than the
poorest quintile. Table 1 gives the quintile data for a few countries, while full
data can be obtained in the World Bank site(12; 13).
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USA (1997) Sweden (1992) Spain (1990) Brazil (1998)
Poorest 20% 5.2 9.6 7.5 2.2
Fourth 20% 10.5 14.5 12.6 5.4
Third 20% 15.6 18.1 17.0 10.1
Second 20% 22.4 23.2 22.6 18.3
Richest 20% 46.4 34.5 40.3 64.1
Gini index 40.8 25.0 32.5 60.7
Table 1
Percentage of income in each population quintile for some selected countries (13).
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Fig. 4. The Lorenz curves and the Gini index for ideal, local and the global case.
Also represented are the World Bank data for Brazil, Sweden and Spain (13).
To measure income inequality in a country and to make a comparison among
countries more accurately, economists use Lorenz curves and Gini indexes. A
Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income against the cu-
mulative percentages of recipients. In Fig 4 we have represented the Lorenz
curves for Brazil, Sweden and Spain. For comparison, we have plotted in same
figure the Lorenz curve of an hypothetical absolutely equalitarian income dis-
tribution that is the straight line with slope equal 1. This figure shows that
Brazil’s Lorenz curve strongly deviates from the hypothetical line of absolute
equality while that for Sweden lies much nearer and that for Spain in the mid-
dle of both. This means that of these three countries, Brazil has the highest
income inequality and Sweden the lowest. We also constructed Lorenz curves
for the local and global cases of CEMM model (figure 4). Clearly we see that
the global case have a Lorenz curve very similar to Sweden, while the local
case is close to perfect equality.
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The Gini index is even more convenient than a Lorenz curve when the task is
to compare income inequality among many countries; it is calculated as the
area between a Lorenz curve and the hypothetical line of absolute equality.
It assumes values between 0 percent (perfect equality) and 100 percent. Of
course, real Gini indexes are always in between. We calculated the Gini index
for the local and global cases. For the local case, the Gini index is 8.07, close
to perfect equality, while its value is 24.71 for the global one (figure 4). This
last value is very close to that Sweden (25.0), and also close to values of other
European developed countries.
Concluding, the analysis of the Gini index shows that globalization (mean field
case) increases the economic inequalities in a conservative economy. Moreover,
the poverty line in global case is well bellow that of the local case (figure 1).
Another interesting aspect is that the minimum dynamic favors the poorest
agent, so promoting wealth redistribution in the sense defined by Rawls (10).
Also, from a strictly economic point of view, high inequality means lower
exchanges, and so it implies in a reduction of the economic activity.
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